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At first sight international issues had little impact on the 1964 election.1 The victor, 
Harold Wilson, made only limited references to foreign policy and defence during the 
campaign and, in a list of eleven major issues drawn up by National Opinion Polls 
(NOP), defence and foreign affairs came at the end with barely one in ten voters deeming 
them significant - well behind the cost of living (79%), education (29%) and housing 
(27%). The only noteworthy defence issue in voters’ minds was Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent, important enough to be treated as a distinct measure in the NOP poll, but even 
that scored a lowly 13%. Traditionally, of course, foreign and defence policy have had 
only a limited impact on British general elections, surprisingly perhaps given the size of 
the country’s Empire, the economy’s dependence on international trade and the 
proportion of national wealth dedicated to defence. The ‘Khaki election’ of 1900 during 
the Boer War, the 1918 election with its talk of ‘hanging the Kaiser’, and the 1935 
election in which issues surrounding ‘collective security’ loomed large, were exceptions 
to the rule. Even humiliation during the Suez Crisis in 1956 had not prevented the 
Conservatives being re-elected with a healthy majority three years later.  
 
Then again, the 1964 election was one of the most closely run in British history 
and an analysis of the campaign shows that, interpreted broadly, international questions 
did have a real effect on the contest. The sitting Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, 
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focused on the future of the nuclear deterrent for much of the campaign, while 
considerations about the country’s relative decline in the world, reflected in chronic 
balance of payments problems, all helped Labour’s case that it was ‘time for change’ at 
the top. Even if international issues have not generally loomed large in British elections, a 
study of the links between the two is valuable for a number of reasons, not least because 
this is a little studied era. Among historians, even the most respected figure may write an 
account of the 1964 campaign that barely mentions foreign policy and defence; while 
many works on British elections by political scientists rarely give much space to the 
international arena.2 Yet the mid-1960s were a significant point for the country’s global 
position. The post-war policy of ‘three circles’, in which Britain played a major role in 
Europe, maintained a global Empire and influenced US policy via the ‘special 
relationship’, was being called into question. In 1962 Dean Acheson had famously 
remarked that ‘Britain has lost an Empire and… not yet found a role.’ The value of the 
Commonwealth was in doubt, a bid to enter the European Community had failed, the 
position of the Pound as a global trading currency was fading and, after 1963, the US 
administration of Lyndon Johnson seemed less disposed than its predecessors to treat 
London as a ‘special’ partner.  
 
While the historiography of Britain’s international policy in the mid-1960s is still 
limited, enough work has been done on the increasingly difficult state of the ‘special 
relationship’3, conflicts in Southeast Asia4, the instability of Sterling and the withdrawal 
from positions East of Suez5, as well as the problems of Aden and Rhodesia6, to suggest 
that these questions deserved public attention in 1964. The following years were to see a 
 3 
rapid withdrawal from East of Suez, a massive devaluation of the Pound and a serious 
decline in British influence in Washington.7 Why, then, was there no national debate 
about these questions at election time? Why did the sitting Prime Minister focus so 
narrowly on the nuclear question, with other foreign and defence issues barely featuring 
in the campaign? Was his focus a wise one? And why did the manifestos of the two main 
parties tend to suggest a consensus position on foreign policy rather than any serious 
differences? This article is divided into two main parts. The first reviews Britain’s place 
in the world in 1964 and the immediate background to the election, before surveying the 
manifestos and the campaigns of the two major parties. The second part analyses the 
campaign and suggests answers to the above questions. This also reflects on whether 
historians of international relations are justified in paying little attention to elections. 
 
 
PART 1: THE 1964 ELECTION 
 
Britain and the World in 1964 
 
When Labour was last in power, under Clement Attlee in 1945-51, Britain took a lead in 
resisting Soviet expansion, became a founder-member of NATO and began to develop 
atomic weapons. While giving independence to India, the government maintained its 
position in the Middle East and took only a limited interest in European integration. Since 
then successive Conservative premiers – Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold 
Macmillan and Douglas-Home – had taken more interest in international than domestic 
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subjects. The process of ‘decolonisation’ had quickened but Britain still held military 
bases across the Indian Ocean, from Aden to Singapore. Backed by the presence of armed 
forces, these were costly in terms of foreign exchange and added to balance of payments 
problems. So did the desire to play a central role in the world economy as banker of the 
Sterling Area, which still included most Commonwealth countries. Yet repeated attempts 
at spending restraint failed properly to link external commitments to limited resources 
and the Conservatives persisted in developing such costly technological projects as the 
TSR-2 aircraft. 8 As economic uncertainty mounted, Macmillan made an application to 
enter the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, only to be vetoed two years 
later by Charles de Gaulle. This made the government more reliant on the Americans, a 
reliance emphasised by Macmillan’s agreement to join a ‘Multilateral Force’ (MLF), 
through which NATO members would share the control of nuclear forces. It was a 
scheme for which the Conservatives actually had little enthusiasm because it was partly 
designed, by some advisers of US President John F. Kennedy, to undermine the 
independence of the British deterrent and thereby pave the way for progress on non-
proliferation talks with the Soviet Union.  
 
There were some successes however. In particular, Macmillan was able to keep 
the country among the nuclear powers by arranging the purchase of Polaris missiles from 
Kennedy, at their Nassau summit in 1962, when the President went against the views of 
some of his closest advisers. Also British attempts to reduce the intensity of the Cold War 
bore fruit in the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, which also helped reassure the public that the 
nuclear arms race might yet be controlled. Furthermore, Britain’s predicament could not 
 5 
all be blamed on the government. The general population seem to have shared the desire 
to play a great power role and showed little resistance, for example, to the decision to 
deploy troops in Malaysia when it was threatened by Indonesia in the so-called 
‘confrontation’ of 1963-66.9 Certainly there would be no rush by Labour to abandon 
Malaysia after 1964, any more than there was to break with the Americans or quickly to 
withdraw from bases ‘east of Suez.’ Even on nuclear weapons, where Labour came 
closest to promising a reversal of policy, there was always ambiguous noise about what a 
Wilson government would do. In February 1964, when pressed on the question in the 
Commons, the defence spokesman, Denis Healey, refused to say whether Labour would 
scrap Polaris.10 
 
In mid-1964 it actually seemed that international questions might dominate the 
political debate: violence in Aden Colony claimed British lives, a minor scandal erupted 
in the defence industry (the Ferranti Affair), there was a threat of violence between the 
Greek and Turkish populations in Cyprus, only recently granted independence by Britain, 
and there was a growing danger of American involvement in the struggle between the 
South Vietnamese government and its Communist-led opponents. Wilson, elected to the 
Labour leadership in February 1963 from the position of Shadow Foreign Secretary, was 
keen to prove he had international stature through visits to President Kennedy and the 
USSR’s Nikita Khrushchev. But Douglas-Home, Conservative Prime Minister since 
October 1963, was a former Commonwealth Secretary and Foreign Secretary, far more at 
home on international questions than domestic ones, who scored some successes on the 
foreign front in June-July. Most significantly he highlighted the potential cost to Britain 
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of a ‘socialist’ foreign policy, when Spain cancelled a contract to build frigates under 
British license. This followed Wilson’s criticism of the deal, leading the Spanish 
government (then under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco) to fear he would 
not honour it. There was genuine rage in the Cabinet and determination to exploit the 
incident. ‘When everyone else is striving to increase exports, he is striving to discourage 
them’, remarked Douglas-Home. The Prime Minister was also keen to exploit the nuclear 
issue against Labour, not only because polls suggested that voters wished to retain the 
deterrent, but also because he had a strong personal belief in the effectiveness of nuclear 
defence.11 Not to be outdone, Wilson again visited Washington and Moscow and in 
speeches at this time, as well as in his book The Relevance of British Socialism, he 
advocated East-West agreements, criticised the attempt to enter the EEC and emphasised 
the value of Commonwealth co-operation. Neither could he be portrayed as lacking 
patriotism: not only did he defend the British presence in Aden and Malaysia, he also 
offset his talk of nuclear disarmament with a commitment to spending on conventional 
arms and devoted a chapter of The Relevance of British Socialism to Britain’s place in the 
world economy.12 Despite the dangers, he also remained defiant on the Spanish frigates 
issue, continuing to try to tar Douglas-Home as an ally of Franco.13 
 
Foreign and defence policies had an important role, then, in the months of 
sparring that preceded the election, and it may have been the Spanish frigates episode that 
helped put the Conservatives back in the lead in some opinion polls. There were few 
other issues at the time that could account for this swing in opinion back from Labour, 
which had seemed well ahead earlier in the year.14 Indirectly, too, questions of Britain’s 
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role in the world had an impact on the setting of the election. The self-doubt that was 
growing in Britain was closely wrapped up in a sense of declining international 
relevance, as the Empire was wound down, ambitions for a genuinely independent 
deterrent waned and de Gaulle vetoed EEC membership. While Britain appeared locked 
in its ‘stop-go cycle’ of economic inertia, the EEC economies were expanding rapidly 
and American political life was reinvigorated by Kennedy. Wilson, indeed, self-
consciously modelled himself on the late American President, saying in a political 
broadcast on 15 July that Labour wanted ‘something like what President Kennedy had 
after years of stagnation – a programme of a hundred days of dynamic action.’ It was an 
image the Conservatives castigated during the election with the party’s vice-chair, Paul 
Bryan, remarking ‘Wilson is no Kennedy and we are not Americans.’15 In fact, as even 
his closest allies recognised, Wilson had no real intention of modelling himself on 
anyone. ‘Kennedy never minded it being known that he had speech writers and advisers’, 
complained Tony Benn, ‘but Harold does.’ But there was no doubt that British politics 
seemed to becoming ‘Americanised’. Wilson took personal control of election plans, 
allowed only a few aides to draft the manifesto and expected advisers to take a low 
profile.16 And the image of a ‘Presidential’ system was confirmed when Douglas-Home 
played a dominant role in his party’s campaign preparations.  
 
Whatever the importance of international factors in the background of the 1964 
election, however, it is evident that both main parties tried to manage events in such a 
way as to avoid embarrassment on such a sensitive area as national security and prestige. 
Just as they baulked at any dramatic steps to dampen demand in the economy at home, 
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the Conservative government certainly tried to forestall progress on ‘nuclear sharing’ 
through the Multilateral Force in 1964, using the impending election as an excuse. On a 
visit to Washington in April the Foreign Secretary, ‘Rab’ Butler, warned the Americans 
that it would be impossible to make decisions on the Force before the poll.17 In this sense, 
of course, electoral considerations had a debilitating effect on policy, preventing some 
questions from being properly dealt with. There was also a tendency for foreign 
governments to avoid making agreements with Britain before the election was decided. 
On becoming Foreign Secretary in October 1963, Butler had realised that it would be 
impossible to achieve much before the next election which, at its latest, had to be held in 
twelve months time. Instead he merely intended ‘to probe’ such issues as improved 
relations with the USSR and the possibilities of further nuclear disarmament. This was 
just as well since, when he visited Moscow in July 1964, he found that ‘Soviet leaders 
were quite aware that a British election was looming and did not feel disposed to reach 
conclusions.’18 The clearest evidence of political parties avoiding controversial positions 
on national security emerges from their election manifestos. 
 
The Manifestos 
 
In 1959-61 Labour had been deeply divided over nuclear weapons with advocates of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament triumphant at the 1960 party conference before the then-
leader, Hugh Gaitskell, struck back the following year. That victory proved decisive but, 
given the bitterness of the debate, it was unsurprising that Labour’s position on nuclear 
questions remained delicate and natural that Douglas-Home should seek to stir the ashes. 
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While the Conservative leader said in December 1963 that ‘we should not try to import 
foreign or defence issues into party politics’, it was clear from his first speech as leader 
that he intended to expose divisions within Labour over nuclear weapons at every 
opportunity.19 And the Opposition were well aware of their lingering vulnerability on the 
question. The American Embassy in London noted that, when the Labour manifesto was 
launched at Wembley in mid-September there was little mention of foreign and defence 
issues. Embassy analysts could only presume that these were topics that it was ‘impolitic 
to stress in party circles.’20 Yet there was certainly no attempt to dodge foreign and 
defence policies in the Labour manifesto. Although one historian has written that it 
‘contained little on foreign affairs’21 these issues actually took up one of the three main 
parts – ‘a New Role for Britain’ - into which The New Britain was divided. They could 
also be said to have been an integral part of the section on economic policy where 
discussion of a proposed National Plan, technology and price stability were closely 
related to the aim of improving the balance of payments, helping Britain pay its way in 
the world.  
 
It was undoubtedly the delicacy of the subject, the danger of divisions reopening 
in Labour ranks and the likelihood Douglas-Home would exploit the subject, rather than 
any intention of utilising it at the forefront of his own campaign, which led Wilson 
personally to draft the sub-section of the manifesto on defence.22 This accused the 
Conservatives of wasting resources on high technology projects, especially missiles and 
aircraft, and vaguely promised ‘value for money’ on weapons procurement in future. 
More important, the defence section attacked the decision to buy Polaris missiles as a 
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delivery system for the British deterrent with the pithy statement, calculated to please 
unilateralists, ‘It will not be independent, it will not be British and it will not deter’: 
instead it would make Britain dependent on America, encourage others (‘including 
Germany’) to want a nuclear arsenal and increase the danger of nuclear war. Yet, when it 
came to stating the alternative, the manifesto was again curiously vague. ‘Re-negotiation’ 
of the 1962 Nassau agreement on purchasing Polaris was promised, but on what basis 
was unclear, and meanwhile the V-bomber force (which did give Britain its own delivery 
system, though one that was increasingly obsolete) would remain. There was also 
condemnation of the MLF, yet Labour wanted a way of controlling NATO’s nuclear 
weapons that gave ‘all the partners in the Alliance… a proper share in their deployment 
and control.’ And talk of ‘strengthening… our conventional regular forces’ sat uneasily 
beside the promise of ‘value for money’ given that, in terms of destructive power per 
Pound spent, nuclear weapons were cheaper. On defence then, the manifesto’s purpose 
was to suggest real differences with the Conservatives and hint at ending the nuclear 
deterrent, without actually making firm undertakings. Conservative Central Office was 
undoubtedly correct that ‘Labour utterances… reflect the need to satisfy their unilateral 
disarmers and neutralists, while at the same time trying to allay public misgivings about 
Labour’s ability to defend Britain.’23 Nor did policy become any more transparent during 
the campaign. Thus one brief insisted the manifesto ‘is crystal clear’ but merely repeated 
such promises as renegotiating Nassau and controlling nuclear weapons via NATO, 
without amplifying how these would work in practice.24 
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Beyond defence issues the manifesto focused on two areas, the ‘End of 
Colonialism’ and ‘Prospects for Peace’ where a common theme was of the Conservatives 
being a backward-looking, unimaginative party. The sub-section on Colonialism played 
up Labour’s record on independence for India; it criticised the Conservatives for being 
dilatory over granting independence and willing to sacrifice the Commonwealth by 
applying to enter the EEC; and, in one of the most detailed sections in the whole 
manifesto, set out seven ways in which Commonwealth trade and co-operation might be 
improved, including the creation of a Commonwealth Consultative Assembly. The sub-
section also included mention of Commonwealth immigration, with an undertaking that 
Labour would ‘legislate against racial discrimination’ if it took power, and it promised 
expanded overseas aid. Yet, once again, on closer inspection, the impression of an 
enlightened pro-Commonwealth outlook was not all it seemed. Not only was there the 
statement ‘Labour accepts that the number of immigrants entering the United Kingdom 
must be limited’, but there was also a hint, in the remark that ‘we shall seek to achieve 
closer links with our European neighbours’ that a renewed bid to enter the EEC might be 
possible. In any case of course, manifesto pledges can mean little or nothing: certainly, 
once Labour was in power, nothing much was heard about improvements to 
Commonwealth trade and co-operation. The sub-section ‘Prospects for Peace’ was partly 
an historical review of the perceived Conservative failure to develop détente with the 
Soviet Union, and partly a promise to do something about this by developing East-West 
trade, pursuing disarmament and bringing Communist China into the United Nations. 
This was tied to stronger support for the UN, including the creation of an international 
police force, with the promise that Labour would ‘end the supply of arms to South 
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Africa’, where apartheid held sway. But once again it was a case of promises being 
ambiguous, an attempt to placate the Left while the election took place. In power Labour 
restricted arms supplies to South Africa rather than ending them altogether, there was no 
breakthrough on détente and the government was severely criticised in the UN over its 
‘colonialist’ policies towards Aden and Southern Africa.25  
  
While foreign and defence policy was placed third in the trio of parts that made 
up the Labour manifesto, they held pride of place in the Conservative one. Fitting 
Douglas-Home’s preferences, the manifesto led off boldly with a statement of the 
Conservatives’ claim to be the party of patriotism and a strong defence, while also 
stressing the readiness of recent governments to talk to the Soviet bloc. ‘Our policy of 
peace through strength has brought Britain safely through years of tension and danger’, 
the section loftily began, ‘It contributes to the security of the free world. It provides the 
realistic basis for better relations between East and West. It keeps this country in her 
rightful place at the centre of international affairs.’ Labour, in contrast, was accused of 
being ‘deeply divided’ on foreign and defence issues, seeking a policy of ‘nuclear 
abdication’ that would ‘relegate Britain to the sidelines.’ The manifesto pointed to the 
one great success for the policy of East-West contacts, the nuclear Test Ban Treaty of the 
previous year, a breakthrough which rather blunted Labour’s attempts to scare the public 
with the dangers of nuclear confrontation. It laid emphasis on hopes for further measures 
of nuclear arms control and even expressed a readiness to discard British weapons, but 
only in the context of multilateral talks. Mention was made of the agreement to place 
Britain’s nuclear weapons at the disposal of NATO; but, significantly, the words 
 13 
‘Multilateral Force’ were avoided and it was categorically stated that the assignment of 
such forces to the Alliance would be ‘subject to our right to deploy them at discretion.’ 
The other main ‘external’ subject covered was the Commonwealth, where it was a case of 
neutralising Labour’s claim to be the party that could best defend ties. The Conservative 
manifesto highlighted the success of a recent Commonwealth conference, the number of 
countries (thirteen) that had achieved independence since 1951, recently-announced plans 
to create a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat and the scale of British aid to 
Commonwealth countries. Other questions, which received merely a brief mention, were 
support for the United Nations, the need for an ‘Atlantic partnership’ and a readiness to 
work with other Western European countries, while acknowledging that entry ‘into the 
European Economic Community is not open to us in existing circumstances.’ 
Surprisingly, international trade was barely mentioned.26  
 
A desire by both main parties to avoid embarrassment on international questions 
clearly emerges from the manifestos. Each tried to criticise the other in general terms - 
the Conservatives were condemned as unimaginative, Labour for being divided - and on 
key issues where there could be said to be a popular consensus, like the need for a strong 
defence, East-West détente and fostering of the Commonwealth, both main parties simply 
claimed that they could do the job better than the other. On more controversial issues 
there was always the possibility of vagueness (as with Labour on the future of nuclear 
weapons) or ignoring a question (as with the Conservative refusal to mention the MLF by 
name).  
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The Campaign 
 
The 1964 campaign, beginning on 15 September, was an unusually long one. National 
Opinion Polls, the agency which had come closest to predicting the 1959 result, believed 
the Conservatives were ahead but only by the narrowest margin and Conservative Central 
Office warned candidates that, ‘Experience of post-war elections has shown that… 
Labour… are normally late starters and strong finishers.’27 So it proved. Despite a poor 
start to Wilson’s campaign, which only really opened with his first press conference on 
25 September, opinion polls began to move back in Labour’s favour in the newspapers of 
Sunday, 4 October. This shift was evidently linked to evidence that Britain’s international 
economic position was much weaker than the Conservatives had tried to portray. Trade 
figures released on 30 September, showed a deficit of £73 million forcing the government 
to announce an increase in borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On 1 
October the Daily Telegraph sensed the shift in Labour’s approach, from pressing its 
reform programme to attacking the Conservatives’ economic record and Tony Benn, who 
had been worried about the state of the Labour campaign, noted ‘The trade crisis has 
given us our opening and the chance to alert a partly apathetic public to the consequences 
of Tory rule if they are returned.’ In his memoirs Douglas-Home insisted that the deficit 
was small and blamed Wilson for the ensuing uncertainty on the money markets. In fact 
both parties were responsible for the crisis that now threatened the Pound. Conservative 
attempts to embarrass Labour, by asking whether the party would devalue the Pound, 
backfired by seeming to prove that a serious monetary crisis was about to occur. While 
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on 2 October George Brown, Labour’s deputy leader, told television viewers, ‘This 
country is lurching towards the biggest economic crisis since the war.’28 Such 
exaggerated rhetoric helped to put the Conservatives on the defensive, but it also ensured 
that the financial markets remained jittery as Labour took office, setting the new 
government on an uneasy road towards spending restraint and eventual devaluation, as 
well as the liquidation of Britain’s world role. ‘They have staked everything on a 
desperate bid to talk the nation into financial crisis’, said Douglas-Home in Glasgow on 5 
October, accusing Labour of a ‘harem scarem’ campaign (’running hares and starting 
scares’). But by then the damage was done and the Prime Minister’s gruelling schedule of 
public meetings was exhausting him, making it difficult to rally the Tory campaign.29 
  
While Wilson rarely gave full treatment to foreign and defence issues, being 
aware of the danger to Labour unity if he became too specific, Douglas-Home regularly 
referred to nuclear weapons.30 At the outset, he decided the retention of the nuclear 
deterrent would be one of the three main planks on which he would fight the election, the 
others being how to reconcile full employment with low inflation and the argument that 
‘Socialism always made things worse.’31 Labour briefs could be caustic about this 
unimaginative approach: ‘Sir Alec’s standard speech is concocted from a limited number 
of basic ingredients whose recipe is hardly altered whatever the occasion.’32 Yet, for a 
time his tactics seemed to pay off. Tony Benn, for one, recognised that in the early phase 
of the campaign – when no single issue came to the fore - Wilson’s interventions lacked a 
consistent message ‘whereas Douglas-Home is out in the streets plugging the two themes 
of prosperity and the need for the Polaris submarine.’33  
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The older man might be a poor television performer and had set himself a more 
demanding schedule, but until early October he seemed to have the edge. On 5 October, 
in what was seen as his best speech of the campaign, delivered in Glasgow, he criticised 
Labour’s ‘council of weakness and despair’ on defence, with its apparent readiness to 
surrender nuclear arms when France and, more worryingly for the West, Communist 
China were just obtaining them. France had carried out its first atomic explosion in 1960; 
China was rumoured to be on the verge of following. In his closing speech of the 
campaign Douglas-Home took up the same theme, declaring ‘the world is still a 
dangerous place. It is just at this moment, when France and China are becoming nuclear 
powers, that the Socialists would propose to discard all control by a British government 
over Britain’s nuclear arm…’ which was ‘our sole defence against blackmail or attack by 
a nuclear power and it is our only passport to the highest councils of the world…’ Wilson 
only fully focused on nuclear issues in one speech, though it was taken up by other 
speakers, notably the former Prime Minister, Lord Attlee, who cuttingly remarked in a 
broadcast at the end of the campaign that ‘if a man had any personality he could put 
across British policy without a nuclear bomb in his hand.’34  
  
Few other defence issues seemed to matter. Aviation minister Julian Amery did 
try to sway voters, especially in his own seat of Preston North, with talk of Labour 
cancelling the supersonic fighter-bomber, TSR-2, on which many jobs in the British 
aerospace industry depended. But Wilson denied the rumours about cancellation, stating, 
in his usual evasive style that if the aircraft ‘works and does what is expected of it at 
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reasonable cost we shall want it…’ (This was typical Wilson evasiveness. Actually the 
aircraft did not survive Labour’s first year in office.)35 As to foreign policy questions, 
even questions that involved, or threatened to involve, British armed forces – such as 
Aden, the Malaysia-Indonesian ‘confrontation’ and Vietnam - failed to arouse much 
interest. This was probably because of the combination of a lack of crisis on any of these 
issues and a consensus over how Britain should deal with them.  In Aden the situation 
seemed to be quite settled an upsurge in violence occurred only in the months following 
the election. While the ‘confrontation’ with Indonesia was at a difficult phase, both main 
political parties supported a firm line on deploying British troops in Borneo to deal with 
it. As to Vietnam, it had seemed to be heading for crisis in early August, when there was 
US-North Vietnamese naval clash in the Gulf of Tonkin, but this incident had simply 
been followed by limited American air strikes and the US was now focusing on its own 
national election campaign, in which President Johnson tried to portray himself as the 
‘peace candidate’ against his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater. In any case, while 
neither main British party showed any desire to become directly involved the conflict in 
Southeast Asia, there was general sympathy at this point for US policy in Vietnam. The 
escalation of US military involvement would only come in early 1965. 
 
Looking away from specific issues to the more general debate, over whether 
Britain should look to a European future and abandon its world role, here too the 
prevailing consensus militated against a real debate. As seen above, in his pre-election 
statements Wilson had suggested support for the British presence in Aden and Malaysia, 
and recent research into the withdrawal from bases ‘East of Suez’ shows that the Labour 
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leadership only decided on withdrawal thanks to a gradual re-evaluation of policy after 
the election was won.36 The EEC, which became a more pressing issue a few years later, 
never took off as an issue although Labour periodically reminded voters of the failed 
entry bid. Once again this was probably because there was general acceptance at this 
point that, even if the Conservatives had pressed the case for entry, there seemed little 
likelihood that de Gaulle would let the British in. True, the EEC was sometimes linked, in 
statements, to the future of the Commonwealth: Wilson claimed at one point that 
Conservatives wished to ‘sell the Commonwealth down the river’ for the sake of getting 
into the EEC, while Heath claimed Labour wanted to turn the Commonwealth into a 
closed bloc. But since both manifestos stated that Commonwealth links would be 
defended, it is not surprising if voters saw little difference between them. Nor did opinion 
polls suggest the electorate cared much about the Commonwealth or the developing 
world – which makes it difficult to explain why Wilson regularly mentioned Labour’s 
intention to expand the foreign aid programme. Most likely this was designed to please 
the Left within his party. But also, rather like Douglas-Home’s conviction that nuclear 
weapons must be retained, a desire to help the developing world represented a personal 
belief of the Labour leader.37  
 
Residual Imperial questions did have an impact in the form of immigration, after 
an influx from the West Indies and from Asian communities in East Africa. They 
numbered about 800,000 by the time of the election. The Conservative front bench did 
not exploit the issue much, though Douglas-Home did defend the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants’ Act in a speech in Bradford on 6 October, arguing that this had prevented an 
 19 
inundation of immigrants.38 For the Conservatives it was an issue fraught with 
difficulties, not least because some candidates did try to exploit immigration on racist 
grounds, most famously in the Birmingham constituency of Smethwick, where Peter 
Griffiths was trying to defeat Labour’s Shadow Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon 
Walker. On 24 September the Birmingham Post summed up the Conservative campaign 
there with the headline ‘Labour win will mean race riots’, forcing Douglas-Home to 
condemn such statements.39 He also made clear, in an open letter, that once immigrants 
had arrived they must be treated as equals40 and it is significant that the Conservatives 
were trying to woo the immigrant vote in some constituencies, with Central Office 
arranging for the translation of election material into Hindi and Urdu.41 But if the 
Conservatives were embarrassed by accusations of racism, Labour was concerned that 
outright opposition to the 1962 Act would prove unpopular on and there was pressure on 
Wilson from Transport House to make clear that Labour policy – based on introducing 
quotas in consultation with the Commonwealth - would hold immigration figures down.42 
Actually, there were only about four constituencies where immigrants were numerous to 
enough to create real concerns about unemployment. The leaderships of both main parties 
generally avoided the issue and, by election time, they could both be said to agree on the 
need for controlled immigration. But in Birmingham in particular some constituency 
Conservative organisations continued to exploit the issue and Smethwick proved 
controversial because Gordon Walker was such a high profile figure, who lost his seat 
against the national trend. He had been a vocal opponent of the 1962 Act and his 
opponent, Griffiths, was determined to link immigration to crime, disease and 
unemployment in a shamelessly populist campaign with which his donnish opponent 
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could not compete. The only other constituency where Labour lost a long-held seat 
apparently because of immigration was Eton and Slough, where Fenner Brockway had 
been MP since 1951. But here the Conservative candidate did not overtly try to exploit 
the question.43 The problem was hardly decisive, then. But, given the narrowness of 
Labour’s majority, even the loss of two seats could be considered important. 
 
Neither of the main foreign policy spokesmen featured much in the campaign, a 
factor that may have reinforced the feeling that international issues were unimportant. For 
Gordon Walker, understandably, the priority was to try to retain his Smethwick seat. As 
to ‘Rab’ Butler, he seemed to be losing his interest in politics, becoming a lacklustre 
Foreign Secretary, living under the shadow of the Prime Minister, who was not only more 
knowledgeable about international affairs but had also beaten him in the fight for the 
leadership after Macmillan’s resignation. Thanks it seems to his own indifference, Butler 
did not have much of a role in preparations for the campaign and Douglas-Home decided 
that, if the Conservatives were re-elected, Butler would be replaced at the Foreign Office. 
Small wonder that Butler appeared at only one party press conference and in only one 
television election broadcast. His only memorable contribution to the campaign was a 
gaffe on 8 October when he told a Daily Express reporter that opinion could run away 
from the Conservatives in the closing days.44 
 
It is significant that there were two international events which, had they happened 
just a few days earlier, could have caused doubts in voters’ minds about a change of 
government at this point. In writing to Douglas-Home to commiserate after the election 
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defeat, David Ormsby-Gore, the Ambassador to Washington, wrote that ‘Almost 
anything could have tipped the balance. Khrushchev’s removal from office twelve hours 
earlier, China’s nuclear explosion thirty-six hours earlier or just Rab keeping his mouth 
shut for once.’ Instead news of the long-predicted explosion of an atomic bomb by 
Communist China came only the day after the election while news of the overthrow of 
the Soviet leader in a Kremlin coup came only a few hours before the polling booths shut, 
too late for the evening newspapers and any television broadcasts that might have 
mattered. Even Wilson later acknowledged, ‘It was an open question whether, if the news 
from Moscow had come an hour or two before the polls closed, there would have been an 
electoral rush to play safe and to vote the existing Government back into power.’ It was a 
theme taken up by Douglas-Home: ‘if the Chinese had happened to give out the news of 
the explosion of the bomb day or two earlier’ might the day have been saved. Yet he was 
also experienced enough to recognise that ruminating over such ‘ifs’ was a pointless 
exercise.45 By 3 p.m. on Friday 16 October it was clear that Labour had won the election 
even if, once all the votes were counted, the overall majority was a bare four seats.  
 
 
PART 2: ANALYSIS. 
 
The Nuclear Issue 
 
Having reviewed the main events of the 1964 campaign from the perspective of 
international questions, what of the questions posed at the outset? Of particular 
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importance, given its centrality to the losing Conservative campaign, why did Douglas-
Home focus so narrowly on the nuclear issue and how wise was this strategy? It is not 
enough to argue that it was unwise because it did not forestall defeat. Many issues may 
have influenced the outcome of the election campaign, one of the longest and closest in 
the twentieth century. Although Labour headquarters at Transport House noted that, by 
11 October, ‘almost everybody expects Labour to win’, right down to the end seasoned 
observers refused to guess the likely outcome. The US embassy for example, refused to 
do so even in the face of pressure from Washington for a prediction; while in Downing 
Street, a memorandum was prepared on what to do in the event of electoral ‘deadlock.’46 
Given the view that Labour may have won simply because of the feeling that it was ‘time 
for change’, the interesting question is how Douglas-Home came so close to victory, and 
this after his party had already won three elections in succession. After all, only a few 
hundred votes in a handful of key constituencies could have given the Conservatives a 
fourth victory.  
 
After the demoralising demise of the Macmillan premiership in 1963, Douglas-
Home was in many ways the Conservatives greatest asset and, since no single issue of 
policy came to dominate the campaign, perhaps his consistency in pushing the need for a 
British deterrent was not too damaging. It is significant that, having won the election 
narrowly and being only too aware that another would be necessary before long, Wilson 
gave up talk of abandoning the Polaris. He probably intended to do this all along, being 
well aware that the deterrent ‘had an emotional appeal to the man in the pub.’47 Douglas-
Home’s persistence in criticising Labour on nuclear defence was certainly understandable 
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in one sense: a Gallup poll showed that more voters (37% to 21%) preferred to retain the 
nuclear deterrent than scrap it whereas – and this is the key point - on almost all other 
major issues Labour was ahead of the Conservatives.48 As noted above, given the virtual 
civil war in Labour ranks over unilateral disarmament under Gaitskell, the Prime Minister 
may have hoped that, by pressing the issue, he could rekindle the embers and so ruin 
Wilson’s carefully crafted policy of restoring party unity. Furthermore, bolstered by his 
own inner certainty that nuclear weapons were vital to British influence and security, this 
was ‘by common consent… the subject on which he spoke most effectively.’ These were 
all understandable reasons for playing the nuclear card.  
 
Nonetheless, the case that Douglas-Home’s was an unwise strategy seems easier 
to sustain. For the nuclear issue never proved to be a trump card, because Labour never 
actually undertook to scrap nuclear weapons (even if they often gave the impression that 
they would abandon Polaris) and, thanks to Wilson’s low-key approach to defence no 
serious arguments broke out within the Labour camp. In any case voters did not feel as 
strongly on this question as they did on domestic ones. The Conservatives were ahead in 
polls over Summer, Wilson needed the largest swing of votes since 1945 in order to win 
and Labour’s campaign got off to an uncertain start, so there is a strong case for arguing 
that the outcome of the election was far from inevitable; that it was, in fact, the Prime 
Minister’s to lose. A Labour post-mortem on the result showed that even the winning 
party felt it less of a victory for Wilson (in fact the number of Labour voters was slightly 
down on the 1959 total) than a loss for Douglas-Home (with many Conservatives staying 
at home or voting Liberal).49 It is significant that other Conservative frontbenchers had 
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less to say on nuclear weapons, some of them evidently fearing that the whole debate 
merely risked worrying people. The only exception was Peter Thorneycroft who, as 
Defence Secretary could hardly avoid the issue, and he only made much of nuclear 
weapons at the party’s daily press conference on 7 October.50 Towards polling day the 
feedback from candidates to Conservative Central Office was that ‘Defence and 
independent nuclear disarmament are now established. We should now concentrate on 
home policy…’ Although Conservative morale remained high until the end, it was feared 
that Labour talk of ‘Time for a Change’ and ‘Wasted Tory Years’ were proving 
effective.51 Yet the party leader continued to plug the nuclear message until the end. Even 
Douglas-Home’s official biographer judged that the Prime Minister played on the nuclear 
issue against ‘all advice’ and ‘ran a Foreign Secretary’s campaign rather than a Prime 
Ministerial one.’52  
 
Butler’s gaffe, at a key moment, in expressing the fear that the election was lost; 
the rowdy nature of certain Conservative election rallies thanks to the behaviour of 
hecklers; and, of course, the announcement of the IMF loan – all of these worked against 
the government in early October. But the Prime Minister might also have relaxed his 
pressure on the nuclear front at that point and focused on other, more significant issues 
for electors, especially after Wilson had proven that he was too astute a politician to say 
much about nuclear weapons himself. Douglas-Home may have felt more confident 
dealing with international matters, but playing to his strengths was not necessarily wise 
given that the voters wanted to hear most about schools, employment and living 
standards. Even if one accepts that his strategy had some justification, especially because 
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nuclear defence was the only real issue where he had the edge over Labour, his almost 
obsessive focus on one topic throughout the campaign was hardly wise. In this, albeit 
negative sense, international issues may have helped ensure that the incumbent premier 
could not stem the Labour tide and had a profound effect on the election. In his memoirs, 
written in the mid-1970s, he was still angry at Wilson’s tactics over Polaris, arguing that 
‘he was, to put it bluntly, ignorant or irresponsible.’ But Douglas-Home’s condescending 
assertion that his opponent had been ‘careless of the first duty of a government which is 
to provide security for its country’ showed a rather quaint, gentlemanly view of politics at 
election time, when Labour was desperate to return to power after thirteen years of 
Opposition. And the argument that Wilson had ‘frightened’ voters, many of whom were 
‘anxious about nuclear contamination of the environment’, does not carry much weight 
given that Wilson had barely mentioned nuclear matters during the campaign and that the 
Test Ban Treaty had already helped assuage popular concerns about the environment.53 
 
Britain’s place in the world 
  
What then of other international issues in the campaign? Why did they feature so little 
and why in particular was there no debate about Britain’s role in the world, especially 
given that the future of the ‘three circles’ was being called into question? In part this 
seems to have been because of the opinion polls that suggested voters themselves were 
far more interested in domestic problems and, unlike some political analysts at the time, 
did not link these problems to the burdens created by defence spending and the world 
role. As a result neither party machine put a major effort into educating their candidates 
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about foreign policy and defence, beyond giving a basic idea of the more obvious issues: 
a series of ninety-seven ‘Questions of Policy’ papers sent out to constituencies by Central 
Office during the campaign included only about half-a-dozen on foreign policy and 
defence54; while a similar series of ‘Questions and Challenges to Labour Candidates’ 
usually had foreign affairs and defence as a relatively short section near the end.55 Central 
Office also recognised that, while women were more likely to vote Conservative than 
men, the former were more concerned with domestic issues.56 All of which makes 
Douglas-Home’s expertise in foreign and defence policy look even more of a liability for 
his party. But to the general public indifference needs to be added the fact that, aside 
from the balance of payments statistics, no other international issue sprang up to surprise 
the parties and electorate during the campaign. The EEC issue was currently quiescent, as 
were Vietnam, Aden and Cyprus, while the fall of Khrushchev and China’s first atomic 
test came too late to justify Douglas-Home’s preoccupation with nuclear security.  
 
 It is also evident, however, that the two main parties engineered a position where, 
rather than heeding Dean Acheson’s concern and debating Britain’s post-imperial role in 
the world, they sought to portray themselves as defenders of a consensus position. This 
was especially clear in their manifestos, where the message was that both would ensure a 
strong defence, preserve the Commonwealth, maintain the Western alliance and develop 
détente with the East. There was also a consensus around the need to face up to Indonesia 
in the ‘confrontation’, achieve a positive balance of payments and control immigration 
while avoiding racial discrimination. Why parties should emphasise the consensus in 
their manifestos, rather than challenge it, is obvious. In general this is the best way to 
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keep voters’ sympathy and ensure the election is won. It also makes it more difficult for 
the opposition to open up a line of attack against you. This feature of campaigns arguably 
justifies the tendency of international historians to pay little attention to elections. 
Election campaigns should ideally, perhaps, be the occasions for a full debate on any 
number of issues, but they rarely are. It is not that parties avoid all hint of differences 
between them: in 1964 both manifestos tried to castigate the other party for weakness of 
division. The overall message, however, was that the consensus was best preserved by 
one party rather than the other. The value of elections for understanding the evolution of 
foreign and defence policy is rendered even more dubious by the tendency of parties to 
make vague, evasive statements designed to avoid controversy and criticism. Thus a 
cursory reading the Labour manifesto and Wilson’s speeches during the 1964 campaign 
might suggest that his incoming administration would abandon Polaris, focus its energies 
on building up the Commonwealth, expand overseas aid, end arms sales to South Africa 
and preserve the TSR-2. In practice, however, none of these was the case.  
 
In one sense, looking at 1964, international questions seem little different to 
domestic ones in their impact. There is often a tendency for parties, on domestic policies 
too, to appeal to the consensus and create images of difference with their opponents, 
while being ambiguous about where concrete differences actually lie. As elections 
approach, many decisions are postponed, while third parties sit back awaiting the 
outcome. Vagueness and evasion are common in manifestos. Special factors, like 
immigration and the fate of TSR-2, will always exist in particular constituencies. It could 
be argued that international issues are different to domestic ones in the sense that world 
 28 
events are more difficult for British politicians to predict and control. But, again, the two 
crises that could have blown up during the campaign, the Chinese atomic bomb and the 
fall of Khrushchev, failed to arrive early enough to save Douglas-Home. He had had 
rather better luck in the months ahead of the campaign, especially with the Spanish 
frigates episode. But luck, of course, has a tendency to run out when it is most needed. 
 
This is not to say that immigration, TSR-2 and Britain’s standing in the world 
were unimportant in such a close run contest. Fears about how Labour would handle 
these issues may have helped pare Wilson’s majority to a minimum. The balance of 
payments deficit and Douglas-Home’s determination to play on the nuclear issue 
certainly deserve to be considered significant. Whether they had as much effect on voters 
as standards of living or the simple feeling that it was ‘time for a change’ after thirteen 
years of Conservative government is debateable in light of the opinion polls evidence. 
But, it is significant that two major swings in opinion during 1964 – to the Conservatives 
in August after the Spanish frigates episode; to Labour after the September trade figures – 
can be linked directly to international concerns. Furthermore, the international context 
helped fuel the notion that it was ‘time for change’, because in Douglas-Home’s election 
strategy could be seen the fruits of thirteen years of rule in which Conservative leaders 
spent far more time on international questions than they did on domestic ones, 
preoccupied with Britain’s world role and the maintenance of strong armed forces. As the 
Empire evaporated, numerous countries outstripped Britain in terms of economic growth 
and the country failed to enter the EEC, the sense of national malaise deepened. That 
malaise had its domestic origins too, but it was made all the starker in the early 1960s by 
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comparisons to EEC growth rates, the burgeoning nuclear might of the Soviet Union and 
the vigorous leadership of John Kennedy across the Atlantic. It is in this intangible sense 
that international considerations may have had their most important impact on the 1964 
election. Only time would show if Labour could alter the country’s sense of decline. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It can be argued that, throughout the twentieth century the main parties ensured that 
foreign and defence policy did not loom large in most elections through a deliberate tactic 
of avoiding controversial positions on questions of national security. Whatever the outcry 
from its radical wing, the Liberal government was careful to maintain the French entente 
and the strength of the Royal Navy in the decade before the First World War; and 
whatever its position as the defender of the Empire, the Conservative party was careful to 
promise a pacific policy between the wars. There generally emerged a broad consensus 
about foreign and defence policy in both these periods, just as there emerged a broad 
consensus behind an anti-Soviet, pro-NATO policy after 1945, linked to the maintenance 
of a global politico-economic role and a close alliance with the United States. In 1964 the 
consensus on foreign policy meant that both main parties promised to support the 
Commonwealth, improve exports, back the UN and seek East-West détente, the 
implication being that Britain’s world role would be maintained, even if Labour seemed 
to hint that the nuclear role would be abandoned. In the next election, in March 1966, 
with Polaris retained and a promise of limited defence cuts, the consensus still held good 
and Labour won handsomely.  
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Yet the twentieth century experience also showed that failure in foreign and 
defence policy could prove costly for governments, even when they had originally sought 
only to mirror the consensus. The drawn-out nature of the Boer War helped ensure the 
Conservatives’ decline after 1900, just as the lacklustre performance of Asquith’s 
Liberals cost them popular respect after 1914. Appeasement cost Chamberlain dear, 
while involvement in the Korean War, linked to substantial defence expenditure, helped 
divide Attlee’s Labour government in 1950-51. Similarly, in the 1960s, it was the 
decision to maintain a global presence as much as anything else that made it difficult to 
address the country’s economic difficulties. Once in power under Wilson, Labour failed 
to cut back quickly enough on defence expenditure, hopes of Commonwealth co-
operation came to nothing and, by 1967, Wilson was thrown back on another attempt to 
enter the EEC. The failure of that attempt, alongside the devaluation of Sterling in 
November and an accelerated withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ announced soon 
afterwards, proved a turning point for the country’s international role. In the following 
years the Pound was stabilised on the foreign exchanges, withdrawal from the Middle and 
Far East proceeded smoothly and the government persisted in its efforts to enter the EEC, 
so that entry talks finally became possible in 1970. But the sense of being controlled by 
events rather than controlling them cost Labour dear and set them on the road to defeat in 
June that year. In retrospect, while a cautious, consensus-based policy may have seemed 
the best course for the parties fighting in 1964, a more radical look at the world role 
might have served the country, and the incoming Wilson government, better. 
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